The global race for copper, lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite and rare earths is creating new opportunities for mineral-rich countries as Western and BRICS strategies become increasingly fragmented. Despite growing talk of competing geopolitical blocs, neither group operates as a unified mining alliance. Producer countries are using this fragmentation to attract competing sources of capital while demanding higher local value creation, domestic processing, infrastructure investment and greater state participation.
For mining investors, this creates a more complicated environment. For resource-rich governments, however, it provides unprecedented negotiating leverage.
Producer Countries Play Multiple Sides
Countries including Chile, Brazil, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Bolivia and Indonesia are adopting variations of the same approach: welcome foreign investment while retaining the ability to adjust ownership rules, royalties, processing requirements and infrastructure agreements. Governments can now negotiate with Chinese state-owned companies, Western miners, Gulf sovereign funds, commodity traders and development-finance institutions simultaneously.
That competition can help governments secure state equity, local-content commitments, railways, electricity infrastructure, technology transfers and long-term industrial investment. The emerging model is therefore less about choosing Washington or Beijing and more about maintaining several strategic options.
Western Critical Minerals Strategy Remains Fragmented
Western governments have developed more coordinated critical-minerals policies, but national priorities remain different. The Minerals Security Partnership, launched in 2022, sought to coordinate investment in responsible mining, processing and recycling. In February 2026, Washington announced FORGE as its successor, signalling a stronger focus on the strategic and commercial dimensions of mineral security.
Yet the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia and European countries have different priorities. Washington is particularly concerned about China’s dominance in refining and permanent magnets. Japan prioritises reliable supplies for automotive and electronics manufacturers, while Canada and Australia must balance strategic objectives with the interests of their mining industries. Europe faces an additional challenge: combining industrial demand with environmental regulation, human-rights requirements and complex permitting procedures.
Europe Wants More Domestic Mineral Supply
The EU Critical Raw Materials Act, which entered into force in May 2024, established targets for 2030, including domestic extraction covering at least 10% of annual consumption, processing covering 40% and recycling 25%. The EU also aims to ensure that no more than 65% of a strategic raw material at a relevant processing stage comes from a single third country.
Implementation is expanding. The European Commission selected 60 strategic projects in 2025, including 47 inside the EU and 13 in third countries and overseas territories. A second application round attracted more than 160 proposals, including 75 battery-material projects and 21 rare-earth projects linked to permanent magnets. Strategic status can improve access to financing and accelerate permitting, but it does not guarantee that projects will secure construction capital.
That financing gap remains one of Europe’s biggest weaknesses. Mining projects compete with lower-risk infrastructure and industrial investments, while complex permitting can delay development and increase costs. Public institutions can provide loans, guarantees and political-risk support, but private equity, construction finance and long-term offtake agreements still have to be assembled for each project.
BRICS Is Not a Unified Mining Bloc
BRICS has expanded to include Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Indonesia, but its members have very different mineral interests. China dominates many processing and manufacturing chains, while India wants to reduce its dependence on Chinese supplies. Brazil is seeking investment from multiple partners, South Africa wants more domestic value from platinum-group metals and other minerals, and Indonesia has used export restrictions to force investment into nickel processing.
The New Development Bank has not evolved into a common BRICS financing institution for mining projects, refineries or mineral corridors. There is also no unified strategic-minerals list, common stockpile or coordinated purchasing mechanism. Most investment remains bilateral or commercial. China nevertheless holds a major advantage because its companies can combine construction, equipment, processing technology, infrastructure financing and long-term purchasing. That integrated model can be especially attractive in countries where Western investors consider political or infrastructure risks too high.
Chile Uses Competition to Strengthen State Control
Chile’s lithium strategy demonstrates how producer countries can use geopolitical competition to their advantage. The government intends to maintain a leading role in strategic lithium resources while allowing private participation through partnerships and independently developed projects. The Codelco-SQM agreement for the Salar de Atacama gives Codelco 50% plus one share of the operating partnership.
Chile is not explicitly choosing between Chinese, European or Western investors. Instead, it can use competition between them to pursue stronger state participation, environmental oversight and domestic economic benefits. European companies may provide access to premium markets, Chinese groups offer battery-industry integration, while Japanese and South Korean companies bring relationships with automotive and electronics manufacturers.
Brazil Seeks to Move Beyond Raw Exports
Brazil occupies an unusually flexible position because it is both a BRICS member and a major investment destination for Western and Asian capital. Its mineral potential extends across niobium, graphite, nickel, lithium, rare earths, manganese, copper and bauxite.
The country’s major challenge is moving further downstream. Domestic separation, refining and advanced-material production would require reliable electricity, transport infrastructure, industrial water, skilled labour and predictable permitting. Maintaining multiple international partnerships can increase investment opportunities, but it cannot compensate for weak project preparation or regulatory uncertainty.
Bolivia Shows That Resources Alone Are Not Enough
Bolivia illustrates the difficulty of converting enormous geological resources into commercial production. The country’s salt flats contain major lithium resources, but complex brine chemistry, limited infrastructure, political intervention and uncertain economics have delayed development. Bolivia has negotiated with Russian and Chinese companies while remaining open to other partners. This preserves strategic flexibility, but agreements do not automatically translate into bankable mines. Investors still need evidence on recovery rates, water management, power availability, processing performance, logistics and contractual security.
Africa Becomes a Battleground for Copper and Cobalt
The Democratic Republic of Congo remains central to global cobalt supply and increasingly important for copper growth. Chinese companies have established significant positions in mining and processing, while Western governments are attempting to expand their role through development finance, infrastructure and offtake support.
The Lobito Corridor, connecting the Copperbelt through Angola to the Atlantic, is intended to provide an alternative export route for Congolese and Zambian minerals.
But infrastructure does not automatically create a Western-aligned supply chain. Mineral flows will ultimately depend on cost, capacity and commercial contracts. African producers can use Western-backed infrastructure while continuing to sell concentrates to Chinese refiners.
Zambia and Zimbabwe Push for More Value at Home
Zambia is pursuing a multi-partner strategy involving the EU, the Lobito Corridor and Chinese investors. Its priority is to increase copper production while improving infrastructure and attracting investment into new and existing mines. Strong copper prices strengthen the government’s negotiating position but can also encourage demands for higher royalties, increased state participation or changes to tax arrangements. Zimbabwe has taken a more interventionist approach to lithium. Restrictions on unprocessed lithium exports encouraged investment in concentrators and processing facilities, including projects such as Sabi Star. Beneficiation requirements can create additional costs for smaller producers. Processing plants require reliable electricity, water, reagents, logistics and sufficient volumes to operate economically.
Indonesia’s Nickel Strategy Shows Both Sides of Resource Nationalism
Indonesia provides the clearest example of aggressive mineral industrial policy. Export restrictions and domestic-processing requirements attracted billions of dollars into nickel smelting, stainless steel and battery materials. The strategy significantly expanded domestic processing and helped Indonesia become central to global nickel supply chains.
But the rapid increase in production also contributed to weaker international nickel prices and placed pressure on competing producers elsewhere. Indonesia demonstrates the potential and risks of resource nationalism: governments can use their mineral endowment to attract downstream investment, but excessive capacity can ultimately reduce commodity prices and weaken the economics of the entire sector.
Investors Must Model Political Risk Differently
For mining companies, the new environment means project valuation can no longer depend only on ore grades, production volumes and commodity-price forecasts. Financial models increasingly need to account for state ownership, variable royalties, domestic processing obligations, local-content rules, export restrictions, supply quotas and potential changes to fiscal agreements.
A mandatory refinery can significantly increase capital requirements. Remote projects may also require dedicated electricity generation, transmission lines, roads, rail links, water systems and port infrastructure. This creates a widening gap between geological resources and financeable reserves. Governments may see domestic processing as essential for industrial development, while lenders view it as additional construction and operating risk. Smaller exploration companies are particularly vulnerable because they cannot easily finance downstream facilities or survive years of permitting delays.
Mineral-Rich States Gain Bargaining Power
The countries best positioned to benefit from the new geopolitical competition will not necessarily be those with the largest deposits. Strong institutions, predictable regulations and credible investment frameworks are becoming equally important. Countries such as Chile, Brazil, Botswana and Namibia can potentially convert competition between foreign investors into long-term development if they maintain stable rules and reliable permitting. A formal critical-minerals cartel remains unlikely. Unlike oil, mineral markets involve different grades, processing technologies and end uses, while high prices can encourage substitution, recycling and new supply.
Instead, the global market is likely to remain decentralised, with producer governments negotiating separately with China, the United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea, India and Gulf investors.
For mining companies, this means geopolitical alignment is becoming less predictable. For producer countries, it creates an opportunity to turn mineral wealth into greater state participation, domestic processing, infrastructure and industrial development. The defining advantage in the next phase of the critical-minerals race will therefore not simply be owning a deposit. It will be the ability to attract competing sources of capital while keeping projects politically stable, commercially competitive and financially bankable.
